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Abstract 
 
CoVaR is one of the pioneering systemic risk measures proposed during the financial 
turmoil of 2008, introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). It is based on the 
familiar risk measurement Value-at-Risk (VaR). In this thesis we apply both the 
time-invariant and time-varying CoVaR model to econometrically quantify the 
systemic risk in the Japanese banking sector. Specifically we study the systemic risk 
that individual financial institutions have on the whole Japanese banking system 
and the systemic linkage among different financial institutions. We use publicly 
traded daily equity data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Market (TSE) spanning 
from 2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31 of the three biggest Japanese bank holding 
companies: Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo. The TOPIX BANKS index is used as a 
proxy for the banking system of Japan in the thesis. We found Mizuho to be the 
riskiest bank in isolation as measured by VaR, but in contrast it has the least 
contribution to the systemic risk of the banking system. Furthermore we found a 
greater difference between the systemic risk of the banks using 1% quantiles 
compared to using 5% quantiles. Examining the pair-wise systemic linkages among 
the three banks, we find the strongest links to be the systemic risk impact that 
Sumitomo has on Mizuho and Mitsubishi, and the smallest to be the impact Mizuho 
has on Mitsubishi, suggesting that Sumitomo is a key player in the Japanese banking 
system. 
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1. Introduction 
The history of systemic risk in finance and banking can be dated a long way back1. In 
the aftermath of a series of financial crises in the Nordic countries, Mexico, Asia and 
Russia in the 90s, there has certainly been interest among academia and regulators 
to study the fragility and contagion of the financial system. However, interest in 
systemic risk has never been as high as after the most recent global financial crisis, 
which has deepened our understanding of how devastating the spillover effect has 
become under the trend of financial integration and innovation. Starting with the 
American subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, several major financial institutions 
collapsed in the US the year after, and moreover, like an epidemic the failure of 
these financial institutions infected the entire financial system and even brought 
severe consequences to the real economy on a global scale with unprecedented 
speed. The world economy is still greatly struggling to recover from the recent crisis, 
with Europe still severely affected by the subsequent Euro sovereign debt crisis.  
So what is systemic risk? It may easily be confused with another well-known risk: 
systematic risk, also known as market risk or undiversifiable risk.  This is e.g. the 
part of the risk of a portfolio that can’t be diversified. Systemic risk – that is being 
studied in this thesis – is a much more complex and multidimensional phenomenon. 
Generally speaking systemic risk is the risk that a “small” economic crisis or event 
triggers a chain reaction which propagates negative effects further onto the entire 
bank and financial system domestically and globally, as exemplified by the recent 
financial crisis. However the precise definition of systemic risk is still quite 
ambiguous and this ambiguous definition is in turn probably one of the causes of the 
relatively slow development of systemic risk research compared to the substantial 
work on other type of risks, especially prior to the recent crisis. This global financial 
crisis has impaired the economy of the world as a whole, but just like a coin has two 
sides, it has surely reignited researchers and regulators’ interests in this subject and 
                                                          
1 For the history of systemic risk see Banerjee (2011). 
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consequently triggered them to reconsider the interconnectedness and fragility of 
the financial system and the importance of measuring and monitoring systemic risk.  
CoVaR is one of the pioneering systemic risk measures proposed during the financial 
turmoil of 2008, introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). It is based on the 
familiar risk measurement Value-at-Risk (VaR) which has been widely used for a 
long time by regulators and researchers as a tool to assess the riskiness of a 
financial institution in isolation. The prefix “Co”, added by Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
stands for conditional, contagion, or comovement. The idea behind CoVaR is quite 
intuitive: it tries to quantify the systemic risk of an institution relative to the 
financial system, by looking at the VaR of the system when a particular institution is 
in a distress condition, i.e. when the particular institution is at its 1% (or 5% VaR) 
level. Furthermore they introduce        to measure the marginal risk 
contribution that one institution has on the system during times of distress. Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) show that there is little correlation between the VaR of an 
institution and its risk contribution to system △CoVaR, and consequently, solely 
monitoring an institution’s VaR is inappropriate for controlling systemic risk.  In 
addition the CoVaR method is not limited to gauging the systemic linkage between a 
financial institution and the financial system. In the same vein it can also be applied 
to study the spillover effect between two institutions.2 
Bandt and Hartmann (2000) label the risk of a systemic event occurring within the 
financial system as horizontal systemic risk, distinguishing it from the risk of 
systemic events originating in the financial sector affecting the real economy, which 
they label vertical systemic risk. In this thesis we limit ourselves to the horizontal 
systemic risk, and apply the CoVaR methodology to the study of systemic risk in the 
Japanese banking sector. We concentrate on the three largest bank-holding 
companies that are listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange market (TSE), namely: 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Mizuho Financial Group and Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, henceforth referred to as Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo 
                                                          
2 For a detailed explanation of the CoVaR methodology, see section 3.2. 
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respectively. There are in total 95 commercial banks listed on stock exchanges 
around Japan, of which 90 are listed on TSE. The reason that this thesis has been 
narrowed down to Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo is that these three bank 
holding companies essentially dominate the Japanese banking sector, holding more 
than half of the total assets of the 90 banks listed on TSE.3 Additionally they are the 
only Japanese banks listed on the Globally Systematically Important Banks (G-SIB) 
list published by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an organization founded in 
2009. (See Table 8 in the appendix.) More specifically, in this thesis we use daily 
equity data spanning from 2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31 of Mitsubishi, Mizuho and 
Sumitomo together with other state variables, for the purpose of answering the 
following four questions: 
1) Firstly, how risky are Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo in isolation? 
2) Second, to what extent do they contribute to the entire systemic risk of the 
banking sector? 
3) Third, what is the systemic linkage among these three mega banks? 
4) Finally, do we get the same results at the 1% and 5% level? 
Although there is plenty of literature studying different markets using VaR, and 
quite a few papers using CoVaR since the method was first proposed by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier, very little research on systemic risk has been undertaken on the 
Japanese banking system. 4 So it is the hope of the author that this thesis may inspire 
further research on the Japanese market. 
A limitation of this thesis is the omission of any data from the Asia financial crisis 
and the period leading up to it. It would be interesting to compare these two crises, 
however due to a series of bank bankruptcies and merges, and other 
recapitalization events in the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, 
                                                          
3 This was calculated based on publically available data from Datastream. 
4 For literature review on CoVaR see section 2.2. 
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we were unable to find any date early than 2001-04-02 with data available for all 
three banks on Datastream.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with giving a 
detailed account of the definition of systemic risk and discusses fragility in the 
financial system. A survey of the existing literature on systemic risk measurements 
in general and CoVaR in particular can be found thereafter. In section 3, a detailed 
explanation of the methodologies used in this thesis will be illustrated. Section 4 
describes the data along with details of the state variables we use. The empirical 
analysis can be found in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Previous literature  
This chapter begins with presenting existing definitions of systemic risk by different 
academics and organizations. Then we will discuss why systemic risk in the financial 
system is of particular interest to academics and regulators. A survey of the existing 
literature on alternative systemic risk measurements and other papers applying  the 
CoVaR methodology can be found in section 2.2. 
2.1 Systemic risk  
As a result of the recent financial meltdown, there has been an unparalleled growth 
of interest in academia and among regulators to study contagion and fragility in the 
financial system and the policy making in response to it. In contrast to this 
consensus, the precise definition of systemic risk is still quite vague as different 
researchers and organizations define systemic risk by looking at different aspects of 
it. Several existing definitions from different academics and organizations are 
presented below: 
 “The risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in 
turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader 
financial difficulties.”(BIS (1994), 64th annual report, p.177)  
“…an event having effects on the entire banking, financial, or economic system, rather 
than just one or a few institutions.”(Bartholomew and Whalen (1995), p.4) 
“Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or 
confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainly about, a substantial portion of 
the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse 
effects on the real economy.”(Group of Ten (2001), G10 report on consolidation in the 
financial Sector, p.126) 
“Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, as 
opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components, and is evidenced by 
comovements (correlation) among most or all the parts.”(Kaufman and Scott (2003), 
p371) 
“...an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic 
or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain 
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of significant losses to financial institutions, resulting in increases in the cost of capital 
or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price 
volatility.” (Schwarcz (2008), p.204) 
Except for Kaufman and Scott (2003), all stated definitions from various academics 
and organizations mention financial systems directly in their definition. However 
systemic risk or spillover effect should not merely be viewed as a financial system 
specific risk as argued by other researchers. For instance, Hellström (2003, 2007, 
2009) views systemic risk from a technological innovation perspective, Bartle and 
Laperrouza (2009) compare systemic risk in network industries5 and financial 
industries and argue the prominence of systemic risk in network industries. Kerste, 
et al (2015) and Reboredo (2015) discuss systemic risk in the energy sector. 
Nevertheless, in the areas of economics, the financial system has been observed to 
seemingly be contagious and more fragile to a systemic event than other sectors of 
the economy. Bühler and Prokopczuk (2009) applied a copula-based measure to 
empirically investigate the grade of systemic risk in the banking sector in 
comparison with 11 other industry sectors in the U.S. using stock market data from 
1990 to 2008. They found that the banking sector had higher levels of systemic risk 
than other sectors, even compared to non-banking financial sectors, especially 
during times of market downturns. 
In the light of Bandt and Hartmann (2000, 2010), there are at least three reasons 
that can possibly account for the presence of additional vulnerability in the financial 
system in general and the banking sector in particular. Firstly, the maturity 
mismatch inherent in the banking business contributes to this vulnerability. A 
traditional role of banks is to act as an intermediator between depositors and 
borrowers. Whereas depositors can withdraw on demand, loans banks make to 
firms cannot be liquidated at a short notice. This mismatch in maturity may result in 
insufficient capital reserves to absorb the interbank trading and credit losses if a 
bank run suddenly happens. Secondly, the high interconnectedness among banks 
and other financial institutions makes banks and other financial institutions more 
                                                          
5 Such as, gas, electricity, transport, communications and water supply. 
10 
 
likely to be exposed to each other’s disturbance.  In the event of a crisis, banks and 
other financial institutions can contaminate through trading with each other via 
interbank money markets, derivative markets and large-value payment and security 
settlement systems, and also simply by investing in similar or correlated assets. 
Information asymmetry lies behind the third reason. The lack of information 
between borrowers and financial institutions and between depositors and financial 
institutions can cause an erosion of confidence and thus make the banking system 
more vulnerable.   
   
2.2 Systemic risk measurements overview 
Since the financial crisis of 2008 reignited interest in the area there is now a 
multitude of approaches to measuring systemic risk. Various researchers have 
proposed different approaches to systemic risk measures varying with the data used, 
the econometrical method employed and the research question of the researcher. 
Since data is a critical and integral part of any research process and in fact data 
availability itself has also been the target of research on assessing systemic risk 
recently, with researchers identifying the lack of reliable and readily usable data as 
a hindrance for effective systemic risk measurements, we begin by exploring 
different systemic risk measurements from a data collection and usage point of view. 
The data used in a systemic risk measure depends on a number of circumstances. 
The researcher may have access to non-public information, for example when doing 
the research from the position of a regulator, or when targeting internal use in large 
institutions. This allows for different models from those based only on public data. 
One such example is the network analysis described in Chan Lau (2009), in which 
the bilateral exposures between banks are used to construct a network, which is 
used to study how one bank failure may cause the failure of other banks, which in 
turn may cause even more failures and so on. However, while they describe and 
exemplify their methods, they make few empirical claims due to the fact that they 
were unable to obtain sufficient data or data of sufficient granularity, a problem that 
a regulator employing the method clearly would be less affected by. 
11 
 
 
What data is available often varies from country to country and even when data is 
available it may not be comparable between countries. E.g. balance sheet data is 
affected by varying accounting practices, making it difficult for researchers to obtain 
equivalent data points to be used in systemic risk modeling. A detailed exposure of 
this issue is provided by Cerutti et al (2012), where they propose consistent data 
from banks be made available, including exposure linkage data used in the above 
mentioned network analysis. 
Another major aspect is the frequency of the data used in measuring systemic risk. 
Here two major categories can be discerned: methods using low-frequency data and 
methods using high-frequency data. Risk measures focusing on macro-level data 
such as inflation, GDP and unemployment naturally falls into the first category. An 
example is Borio and Drehmann (2009) who use GDP along with equity, credit and 
real estate property prices as input to early warning indicators, meant to signal 
when the banking system is in distress. The paper evaluates the performance of an 
earlier method published in Borio and Lowe (2002), using new data from the period 
preceding the 2008 crisis, concluding it would’ve had limited success predicting the 
crisis. High-frequency methods are typically based on daily stock market prices of 
equity, credit default swaps (CDS) and similar. Huang et al (2009) use both low and 
high frequency data, including CDS and equity return, to estimate the Distress 
Insurance Premium (DIP) systemic risk measure as the cost of insurance against 
financial distress, based on the default probabilities of individual banks and 
forecasted asset return correlations. Segoviano and Goodheart (2009) also use CDS 
spreads to calculate a number of Banking Stability Measures (BSMs) from a 
multivariate density function estimated from individual bank’s probability of 
distress.  
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) estimate their CoVaR measure, which falls into the 
high-frequency methods category, using asset returns and quantile regression. This 
is the method used in this thesis. They use publicly traded data at weekly frequency 
of 1226 financial intuitions consisting of commercial banks, security broker-dealers, 
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insurance companies and real estate companies, covering the period of 1986Q1 to 
2010Q4. CoVaR is the VaR of the system when a specific bank or institution is in 
distress, i.e. the VaR of the system when the bank is at its VaR-level.        is a 
useful and comparable measure of the contribution to the risk of the system. In their 
paper, they estimate CoVaR using both time-invariant and time-varying models. The 
time-invariant CoVaR model, just as the name implies, produces a single estimation 
of systemic risk for the entire time period. The shortcoming of this unconditional 
model is that it can’t capture the variation of systemic risk throughout time. Thus 
they further introduce a time-varying CoVaR model in which they regress the asset 
returns of each institution and the financial system on selected macro state 
variables using quantile regression. Furthermore they apply panel regression 
techniques to construct a forward-△CoVaR model projecting △CoVaR directly using 
lagged accounting data, such as leverage, maturity mismatch, market-to-book ratio, 
size, equity return volatility and equity market beta, intended be a counter-cyclical 
measure to capture the slow build-up of systemic risk in a forward looking manner. 
Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) study the Thai financial system using the 
methods of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Specifically they study the △CoVaR of 
the equity prices of 6 major Thai banks, based on stock market data stretching from 
1996 to 2009, which notably includes the 1997 Asia financial crisis. The state 
variables used are the prices and volatility of the SET index (Stock Exchange of 
Thailand index) at different lags. They give a slightly different definition of △CoVaR: 
the difference between the distress state CoVaR and the unconditioned VaR of the 
system is used, instead of the difference between the distress state CoVaR and the 
median state CoVaR used by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). They further use the 
properties of CoVaR to calculate a financial linkage metric, to measure spillover 
effects. 
López-Espinosa et al (2012) use an asymmetric CoVaR, differentiating between 
contracting and growing balance sheets to study 54 international financial 
institutions. They find strong evidence for asymmetry and that short-term whole-
sale funding contributes strongly to systemic risk. 
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Girardi and Ergün (2013) use a slightly modified CoVaR where the distress event is 
defined as the institution experiencing losses worse than the VaR, rather than losses 
exactly at the VaR level. This modification has useful mathematical properties, 
allowing backtesting of CoVaR using a simple Kupiec test similar to the procedure 
for VaR. However, the simple estimation method using quantile regression used by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier is no longer applicable, and instead they use multivariate 
Gaussian GARCH models.  
Another pioneering systemic measure which also use equity returns and has many 
similarities with CoVaR is Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) developed by Acharya 
et al (2009). They develop an approach whereby banks can be taxed according to 
the sum of their expected default losses and their expected contribution to a 
systemic crisis. The latter is equal to the expected amount a bank is 
undercapitalized in a future systemic event and referred to as Systemic Expected 
Shortfall (SES), and this can be estimated from MES and leverage. MES in turn is 
defined in their report as the average return on the 5% worst days of the market. 
From this definition it is clear that the conditioning is reversed from that used by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier in CoVaR (analogous to what they refer to as Exposure-
CoVaR). The ideas in Acharya et al (2009) are further developed by Brownlees and 
Engle (2012) in their SRISK index. They use a bivariate GARCH model to obtain a 
time series estimation with better predictive power than that of SES. An advantage 
of SES compared to the method used in this paper is that the measure is additive 
with respect to the merging and splitting up of economic entities. This stems in part 
from the inverted conditioning relative to the one employed in this paper. 
Finally, for an excellent in-depth overview see Bisias et al (2012), who carefully 
discuss and categorize 31 systemic risk measures in multiple ways. They also 
summarize the methods and list data required for input, output and empirical 
results of the relevant papers. Furthermore they also provide open source 
implementations of each measure, listing MATLAB header files for each function in 
their comprehensive report. 
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3. Methodology 
In this section we introduce the quantitative methodologies employed in this thesis. 
We begin this section by introducing Quantile Regression (QR) which we use to 
estimate CoVaR and △CoVaR. Followed by QR, we will present the definition of 
CoVaR and △CoVaR in more detail and describe both the time-invariant and time-
varying models in section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. In the last section, we introduce the Kupiec 
test which we use to validate the quality of our VaR models.   
3.1 Quantile Regression 
Quantile Regression (QR) was first proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and it is 
a statistical and econometrical approach to investigate the relationship between the 
explanatory variables X and the response variable at different quantiles of a 
probability distribution. The classical least squares estimator which only examines 
how the mean of the dependent variable changes according to the mean variation of 
a set of independent variables, may be very inefficient in linear models with non-
Gaussian errors as Koenker and Bassett (1978) argued in their paper. QR provides a 
more comprehensive view of the relationship between the regressors and the 
response variable, since QR can more accurately describe the shape and interval of 
the relationship, and in particular is able to grasp the special characteristics of the 
tail of the distribution.6 
In the field of financial economics, the application of quantile regression can often 
be found in the modeling of tail events of financial returns, especially Value at Risk 
(VaR) estimation. For example, Engle and Mangenelli (2004) proposed a conditional 
autoregressive value at risk model (CAViaR) based on QR in combination with a 
GARCH model. See also Christoffersen, Hahn, and Inoue (2001), Giacomini, R., and 
Komunjer, I. (2005), Taylor (2008) and Gaglianone et al. (2011) for further reading. 
                                                          
6 After the methodology had first been proposed, it was widely applied and developed in various 
research areas. The interested reader can refer to Yu et al. (2003), who used some simple examples 
to demonstrate how the methodology can be effectively used in areas such as medicine, survival 
analysis, environmental modelling, financial economics and the detection of heteroscedasticity. 
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Whereas solving OLS manually by hand is quite easy, this is not the case for quantile 
regression. However, with a computer the minimization problems from quantile 
regression can be solved efficiently using linear programming and the simplex 
method. Quantile regression is widely available in most popular statistical software 
packages. As such, we only give a cursory overview of quantile regression. For a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject see Koenker and Bassett (1978) and 
Koenker (2005). 
To understand quantile regression we start from a simple linear regression model:  
            , 
where    is the independent variable,    is the dependent variable and   and   are 
the parameters and    the error term. 
We may find   and   using OLS by solving the following minimization problem: 
   
  
             
 
 
   
 
Now let’s first look at a special case of QR – Median Regression. Recall that median is 
the 50th percentile. The objective function for the median regression is as follow: 
   
  
             
 
 
 
Thus, instead of minimizing the sum of the squared residuals we minimize the sum 
of absolute residuals. The above expression can be reformulated as follows: 
   
  
             
        
              
        
 
By adding weights to scale the deviations, corresponding to the quantile  , we arrive 
at the corresponding objective function for the  th quantile regression: 
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By adjusting the scale of  , we can study the distribution of the response variable Y 
given a set of regressors X under different quantile levels. The resulting line can be 
interpreted as a conditional linear estimation of the  -quantile for Y for a fixed value 
of X. Koenker (2001) 
3.2 CoVaR 
3.2.1 Definition 
CoVaR was first introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier in 2008. The prefix 
“Co“ stands for conditional, contagion, or comovement. By taking the nature of 
systemic risk into consideration, CoVaR distinguish itself from other existing risk 
measures which only look at the risk of an institution in isolation. By quantifying 
CoVaR we can examine the risk that an institution (or the whole financial system) 
faces when another institution is in its extreme condition. Following Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011), we define such an extreme event to be when the returns of 
the institution is exactly at value-at-risk level of the institution. The financial system 
is proxied by a portfolio consisting of all banks, allowing it to be treated just as an 
institution in the following. 
      
   
 as presented in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) is the q-quantile VaR of 
an institution j conditional on another institution i being at its     quantile VaR level, 
where j often refers to the whole financial system. For ease of reference we will 
follow the sign convention used in their paper, meaning that we deal with returns 
rather than losses. As a consequence, VaR is typically a negative value. 
This gives us the following (implicit) definition: 
             
       
        = q, 
where    is the variable under study of institution j, and       refers to an event 
relating to variable    of institution i. 
To measure the marginal risk contribution that one institution has on another 
institution during times of distress Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) introduce the 
17 
 
risk measure       . It measures the change in the VaR of institution j as 
institution i goes from its median state into its distress state (where returns are at 
VaR-level). Specifically,  
       
   
       
      aR 
       
      edian 
 , 
where edian  is the 50%-VaR. This measures the risk contribution that institution 
i has on institution j. 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) show that there is little correlation between the 
     of an institution and its risk contribution to system       
system  
. 
3.2.2 Time-invariant estimation 
As noted, we use Quantile Regression to estimate CoVaR, both the time invariant 
unconditional estimate as well as the conditional version. 
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we start out with the following linear 
 -quantile regressions for the time-invariant estimation, one per institution: 
 system             
where  system is the returns of the system portfolio and    the returns of the 
institution. The estimated parameters then give us an estimation of the  th quantile 
of  system, conditional on a particular   . This is precisely an estimate of the system 
VaR conditional on   : 
     
system
       
     
    
where    
  and    
  are the estimated parameters from the regression for institution i 
above. By setting       
  we arrive at the CoVaR measure of Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011): 
      
system         
    
     
     
  
With the corresponding measure for        being: 
       
system  
    
     
     
      
     
  edian      
      
   edian   
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3.2.3 Time-varying estimation 
Since VaR is not directly observable it must be estimated, and a simple way to do 
this is to find the  -quantile. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) expands on this idea 
to obtain a time-varying estimate by running a quantile regression that regresses 
the returns of an institution    on a number state variables believed to well capture 
the underlying risk of return.7 The predicted value of this regression gives a time-
varying  -quantile estimate of    – i.e. a time-varying estimate of     . Thus, from 
the state variables and the regression parameters we calculate a time series of     . 
Specifically, the following regression 
  
            
  
leads to the predicted values 
      
     
    
    
Then, for CoVaR we similarly use another regression: 
  
system
  system    system    
   system       
system  
 
Including    in the regression will allow us to get the predicted value while 
conditioning on        
 , by changing the input to the regression equation (i.e. 
setting         
 ). Thus we arrive at the time-varying CoVaR estimate of Adrian 
and Brunnermeier: 
        
    system     system        
   system     
From this we can then estimate the time-varying        for each institution: 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) actually used lagged state variables in their model. Other 
researchers instead use contemporaneous state variables in estimating CoVaR. In this thesis, we will 
use contemporaneous state variables, since we found contemporaneous state variables to have more 
explanatory power than lagged state variables in estimating systemic risk in the Japanese banking 
system.  
19 
 
         
          
            
  
                        system     system        
   system    
    system     system          
   system      
                        system         
          
   
Note: CoVaR is based on the same VaR of the system under different conditionings, 
so it is always calculated at the same quantile (e.g. 1%-VaR). This means that only 
the quantile of the conditioning event changes between         
  and           
  so 
that the estimated parameters remain unchanged, whereas       
  becomes 
        
 . 
3.3 Backtesting - Kupiec test  
We can see from the above that to some degree CoVaR, which studies the dynamics 
of the spillover effect and co-movement in risk in a system, can be considered an 
extension of  aR, which in turn measures an institution’s risk in isolation. Using 
time-invariant estimation, we obtain a constant VaR and CoVaR for the whole time 
period. By contrast, for the time-varying estimation we use a number of state 
variables to estimate VaR and then to estimate CoVaR based on both the VaR 
estimation and the state variables. Therefore it is important to backtest the VaR 
estimation under a time-varying model before we go on with CoVaR and △CoVaR 
estimation.  
There are several backtesting models that can be used to test the accuracy of VaR 
models. In this thesis we implement the Kupiec frequency test named after Kupiec 
(1995) which is widely used among researchers and quite intuitive to understand. 
The basic idea of the Kupiec frequency test is to check if the frequency of violations 
(by “violation” we mean the case that an actual loss is larger than the corresponding 
VaR estimation for the day) is consistent with the expected frequency of violations. 8 
If these two frequencies significantly deviate from each other under certain 
predetermined statistical confidence levels, the performance of this VaR model is 
                                                          
8 Another broadly used test is due to Christoffersen (1996). Christoffersen’s test and other 
Conditional methods, test whether the violations are independent of each other. 
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poor and should be rejected. The Kupiec frequency test follows a Binomial 
distribution, thus the probability of having   VaR violations in a sample of N 
observations is: 
         
 
 
            
We can either test if the actual failure frequency is too high by implementing a one- 
side test or check whether the frequency is too high or too low by doing a two-sided 
test. In this thesis we will use the two-sided test. In order to do so, we first use the 
expected violation frequency   (  denotes the     quantile) to construct a 
confidence interval              under a certain significance level. (Note: typically a 
significance level of 1% or 5% is used. Under a two-sided significant test, we thus 
use 0,05% or 2,5% on each side of the tails.) If the actual number of violations   lies 
within the confidence interval, the model is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.  
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4. Data 
All data used in this thesis was collected from Datastream. The data consists of daily 
stock prices from Mitsubishi, Mizuho, Sumitomo and the banking system9, along 
with the macro state variables we use for the time-variant CoVaR estimation. 
Furthermore, the daily return of banks and indexes is calculated by   
  
  
      
 
    
  
where   
  is the price of the bank or the index.   
We are using data starting 2001-04-02 and ending 2015-01-31 which covers the 
recent financial crisis, yet it would have been desirable if we could have included 
data from before the Asia financial crisis as well. Unfortunately, due to a series of 
bank bankruptcies and merges, as well as other recapitalization events in the late 
20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, we were unable to find any date 
earlier than 2001-04-02 with data available for all three banks on Datastream. In 
terms of data frequency, we have in fact attempted to model CoVaR with data in 
both daily and weekly frequency. However, the result suggests that the difference in 
which data frequency we choose is negligible. In addition we found the results from 
using daily frequency to be slightly better, and thus we chose this to compute VaR 
and CoVaR in this thesis.  
As for the whole banking system, the TOPIX BANK index from TSE is used to 
represent the banking system of Japan. As an alternative to the TOPIX BANK index, 
the TOPIX-17 BANK index can also be used as a proxy for the entire banking sector, 
but its base date only runs back to 2002-12-30. To keep the data length consistent, 
we settled on the TOPIX BANK index instead.10 
For the time-variant estimation of        and         , a number of macro state 
variables are introduced to construct the regression. The state variables should be 
able to well capture the risk embedded in asset returns from different dimensions. 
Following the selection criteria suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and 
                                                          
9 As for the banking system it is explained in further detail below. 
10 According to TSE the constituents are the same and they only differ in their base date and base 
point. TOPIX-17 Series: Base Date 2002-12-30, Base Point 100; TOPIX Sector Indices: Base Date 
1992-01-06, Base Point 1000. 
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our empirical results, we chose to include the following three state variables in the 
Time-varying CoVaR model: 
 Nikkei 225 index daily return (henceforth referred to as Nikkei 225): We 
use this index as a proxy for daily equity market return. Nikkei 225 is a price-
weighted stock market index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Similar to 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nikkei 225 consists of the top 225 blue-
chip companies listed on the TSE and the constituents are reviewed annually. 
Accordingly it is the most widely cited average of Japanese equities. 
 Volatility index Japan (henceforth referred to as VXJ): We use the daily data 
of VXJ as a benchmark of future market volatility in the stock market of Japan. 
VXJ is presented by the VXJ Research Group at the Center for the Study of 
Finance and Insurance, and it is considered to be the equivalent to Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (known as VIX) for the 
Japanese market. 
 Yield spread (henceforth referred to as YS): This variable is calculated by 
computing the difference between the interest rates of 10-year Japanese 
government bonds and the 3-month interest rate for government securities 
and treasury bills. This variable is considered to reflect the time variation in 
the tails of asset returns. The original raw data of the 10-year Japanese 
government bond rates obtained from Datastream is listed on a daily basis. 
However the raw data of the 3-month interest rate we obtained from 
Datastream is displayed with monthly frequency, so in order to keep the 
frequency in line with all other data, we converted the data to daily 
frequency using a constant rate for each month. An alternative would be to 
use linear interpolation to smooth the data; however when we experimented 
with this in our model we noticed little to no difference. Looking at the data 
itself, this finding is hardly surprising, as the monthly variation in both 3-
month interest rates for Government securities and treasury bills is very 
small. 
23 
 
5. Empirical results 
The empirical results and analysis thereof can be found in this chapter. There are 
four sections in this Chapter. Section 5.1 presents descriptive statistics of the data, 
namely the daily returns of Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo, TOPIX BANK as well 
as the state variables used in the Time-varying CoVaR model. The empirical results 
of the Time-invariant CoVaR model will be exhibited and discussed in 5.2, and the 
time-varying VaR, CoVaR and △CoVaR in section 5.3. In addition, since the daily 
time-varying VaR model constructed using the state variables is a crucial first step in 
estimating the time-varying CoVaR and △CoVaR of the three banks, the VaR models 
of each bank will be backtested using a Kupiec test in this section as well in order to 
confirm the eligibility of the VaR model and provide reliable time-conditional CoVaR 
estimation. This chapter closes with section 5.4 that explores the systemic linkages 
of Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo.  
5.1 Summary statistics 
In this section we focus on the statistical properties of the above described data 
sources. The summary statistics are exhibited below, starting with the statistics for 
the stock returns of each bank and the system in Table 1, followed by the statistics 
of the state variables in Table 2. For each time series we show mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera 
test statistic. 
For comparison we also include the market index Nikkei 225, one of the state 
variables used in the time-varying modelling, as it is interesting to compare the 
performance of the three banks and the banking sector index with a market index.  
There are 3609 samples in each time series. Starting from the top of the table, the 
daily average return of all three banks clearly outperformed those of the entire 
banking system as seen in TOPIX BANK with a significant marginal. Mitsubishi has 
the highest daily return of 0,00971% which is 51 times that of TOPIX BANK, while 
Mizuho has the lowest mean of 0,0063% which is in fact still 33 times that of TOPIX 
BANK. However, the market as proxied by Nikkei 225 has an average daily return 
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higher by an order of magnitude compared with the banking sector and all three 
banks in our sample. 
Table 1 
Summary statistics for the daily returns of the three mega banks and the financial 
system (2001-04-03 to 2015-01-31) 
  
Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo 
TOPIX 
BANK 
(Nikkei 
225) 
 Mean 0,00009710 0,00006 0,00007371 0,00001896 0,0002005 
 Median 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 Maximum 0,1576 0,1950 0,1685 0,1524 0,1415 
 Minimum -0,1464 -0,1621 -0,1511 -0,1250 -0,1140 
 Std. Dev. 0,02371 0,02950 0,0268 0,01926 0,01508 
 
Observations 3609 3609 3609 3609 3609 
  
  
      
 Skewness 0,5150 0,4766 0,3862 0,2533 -0,2614 
 Kurtosis 7,416 9,057 7,552 7,907 9,941 
 Jarque-Bera 3091 5653 3205 3659 7285 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Note: Nikkei 225 included for comparison. Sample period for the stock prices for each bank and the 
TOPIX Banks and Nikkei 225 indexes start from 2001-04-02, therefore the daily return series starts 
from 2001-04-03 to 2015-01-31. 
 
We observe that Mizuho accounts for both the largest return (19,5%) and the 
smallest return (-16,22%) in the sample, which is consistent with its standard 
deviation of 0,0295 being the largest, i.e. highest price-fluctuation. Notably the 
standard deviation of the banking sector TOPIX BANK is higher than that of the 
market and all three banks in turn have markedly higher volatility than the banking 
sector and the market. Since higher volatility often accounts for higher risk, we 
expect Mizuho to be the most risky entity in isolation, when measuring VaR in later 
analysis. 
Looking at kurtosis we see that all series have values much greater than 3, implying 
fat tails as is common in financial data. Looking at the Jarque-Beta test statistic 
further confirms the non-normality of the data. However, this non-normality should 
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not necessarily affect the result of our VaR and CoVaR estimations, since quantile 
regression doesn’t assume normality. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the macro state variables used in 
estimating the time-varying VaR, CoVaR and △CoVaR measures. For description and 
construction of each variable see Section 4.  
Table 2 
Summary statistics for state variables (2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31) 
  Nikkei 225 VXJ LS YS 
 Mean 0,0001992 26,25 0,1207 1,063 
 Median 0,000 24,86 0,08581 1,098 
 Maximum 0,1415 91,45 0,5620 1,924 
 Minimum -0,1141 11,52 -0,04886 0,2137 
 Std. Dev. 0,01508 9,493 0,1099 0,3287 
 
Observations 3610 3610 166 3610 
  
     Skewness -0,2612 2,463 1,911 -0,1322 
 Kurtosis 9,943 12,67 5,940 2,294 
 Jarque-Bera 7291 17710 160,8 85,42 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Note: As mentioned the original data for LS are on a monthly basis; therefore there are only 166 
samples in the LS series. However LS is expanded to daily frequency in later analysis. For details on 
this see Section 4. 
 
In order to look for signs of multicollinearity in our Time-Varying CoVaR model, 
which can lead to overfitting, a correlation matrix table is set up to look for any 
variables displaying high correlation. Multicollinearity is quite common in 
econometrical modelling, and although it won’t affect the unbiasedness of estimates 
overall, models that suffer from multicollinearity may display results showcasing a 
high R² but with inefficient estimates, large standard error and Type II errors. 
Inspection of the correlation matrix below we see that the state variables show very 
little correlation pairwise; hence we conclude that there is no severe 
multicollinearity among the state variables. 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix for state variables 
  Nikkei 225 VXJ  YD 
Nikkei 225 1,000 
  VXJ  -0,0994 1,000 
 YD 0,0029 -0,0651 1,000 
 
5.2 Systemic risk analysis: Time-invariant CoVaR 
In this section the time-invariant measures of systemic risk will be closely examined. 
Using quantile regression on the three banks and the system, the time-invariant VaR, 
CoVaR and △CoVaR have been calculated at the 1% and 5% level respectively, and 
displayed below. Based on these measurements we will analyze and rank each bank 
based on the risk of the bank in isolation as well as the systemic risk it imposes on 
the system. Observing the results for the different quantiles, i.e. at 1% and 5%, we 
notice that the rank of each bank in terms of the time-invariant VaR, CoVaR and 
△CoVaR are almost the same. Both results will be presented and discussed in the 
following figures. 
Figure 1 
Time-invariant VaR estimation (2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31) 
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The first observation from the above figure is that Mizuho has the most negative 
1%-VaR at -0,08189 as well as the most negative 5%-VaR at -0.0460, implying 
Mizuho is the riskiest bank among all three banks in isolation, while Mitsubishi has 
the least negative 1%-VaR at -0,05982 as well as 5%-VaR at -0,0360.  Finally the 
1%-VaR of Sumitomo is -0,07307, and the 5%-VaR is -0,0408. In other words, the 
above Time-invariant VaR estimation indicates that the probability is 1% that 
Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo and TOPIX BANKS will lose more than 5.98% , 
8.19% , 7.31% and 4,94% a day respectively, and the probability is 5% that they will 
lose more than 3.60% , 4.60% , 4.08% and 2,94% a day respectively. 
The next observation is that the VaR of all three banks in isolation all exceed the VaR 
of the system TOPIX BANKS as a whole, which suggests that all three banks are 
riskier than the whole banking system when measured in isolation. As expected 
when inspecting the statistical properties of each bank and the banking system in 
section 4, ranking the banks according to riskiness based on their VaR in this way 
gives identical results as ranking the banks based on their standard deviation, which 
is further evidence that standard deviation, although a crude measure, is useful for 
measuring risk at a glance. 
Next the CoVaR corresponding to each bank at both the 1% and 5% quantile is 
calculated and shown in Figure 2. For the same quantile level, the CoVaR of all banks 
are approximately the same, suggesting that the distress of either bank leads to 
similar negative outcomes for the system. The unconditional VaR of the system 
calculated above is also included in the rightmost column for comparison, since the 
CoVaR shown in the figure refers to the VaR of the system in different situations, 
and in particular when a bank is in distress. 
Figure 3 exhibit the result of Time-invariant △CoVaR. Following Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011), △CoVaR in this thesis is calculated as the difference in system 
VaR between the two events of a specific bank being in distress and operating as 
usual, i.e. being in its median state (at 50% VaR level). According to our Time-
invariant model, Sumitomo is slightly more systemically important than the other 
28 
 
Figure 2 
Time-invariant CoVaR estimation (2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31) 
 
Figure 3 
Time-invariant △CoVaR estimation (2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31) 
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two banks when looking at the 1% quantile, whereas Mitsubishi is showing the 
highest systemic importance at the 5% quantile. However the difference between 
 itsubishi’s △        d Su  t   ’s △       s  l  st  egl g ble: 0,06% when the 
quantile is set to be 5% and 0,18% when it is 1%. Therefore to compare the ranking 
 f △       t d ffe e t qu  t les may not be very interesting. What is interesting 
though is that while Mitsubishi is the least risky bank in isolation as measured by 
VaR, its distress seems to impart just as much externalities on the whole banking 
system as the distress of Mizuho or Sumitomo. This again suggests that to regulate 
and monitor banks solely based on their VaR, i.e. the risk of an institution in 
isolation, might be insufficient to insulate the banks against systemic risk.  
The reason that we adopt the definition of △CoVaR from Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) is that it compares two conditional VaR:s, rather than comparing one 
conditional VaR with an unconditional VaR. This allows us to better isolate the effect 
that a single bank being in distress has on the system. 
There are other definitions of △CoVaR. For instance, Roengpitya and 
Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) define an institution’s △CoVaR as the difference between 
the institution’s Co aR and the system’s unconditional  aR, i.e. this is the difference 
between the rightmost bar and the other bars in Figure 2 above. This may be easier 
to understand at a glance since the increase in the system’s VaR conditioning on 
different banks can be understood as the risk that the underlying bank has imposed 
on the banking system. Using their definition to compute △CoVaR will indeed give 
different results from our △CoVaR estimation. Furthermore, there is a potential 
problem in that it is unclear if a conditional VaR can be compared to an 
unconditional VaR, or if this constitutes comparing apples and oranges. It is outside 
the scope of this thesis to explore this issue in detail. 
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5.3 Systemic risk analysis: Time-Varying CoVaRt 
In this section the empirical results of the time-varying CoVaR model will be 
presented and discussed. Unlike the Time-invariant model that yields an estimation 
that is constant over time, this model is intended to capture the variation of 
systemic risk over time, allowing us to explicitly study the dynamics of systemic risk 
under different market conditions.  
Similar to the time-invariant model, the first step of estimating         
   and 
         
  is to compute       
 . We plot the average conditional     
  below at both 
the 1% and 5% quantile level for Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo on a quarterly 
basis for the entire data period, i.e. from 2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31. In both 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 a significant drop can be clearly observed in 2008Q4, when 
the world was in a severe financial crisis. Overall, we see that the     :s of all three 
banks follow a similar pattern at both the 1% and 5% level. However, the line 
showing itsubishi’s  aR clearly lies above the lines of both Mizuho and Sumitomo, 
from which we conclude that Mitsubishi is the least risky bank in our data set. While 
Mizuho and Sumitomo often coincide, we can discern that the downward 
movements of Mizuho are greater than that of Sumitomo. The results are in line 
with the VaRs estimated using the time-invariant model in the previous section. 
Since computing     
  is an indispensable part of modelling time-varying       
  , 
the quality of our     
  results is crucial to all later estimation. Thus we implement a 
Kupiec Test to backtest and evaluate the reliability of our     
 , which is estimated 
using quantile regression from the selected contemporaneous state variables. We 
chose to apply a two-sided Kupiec Test thus if the number of violations of each VaR 
series is between 22-52 and 160-215 for quantiles at 1% and 5% respectively, the 
model is accepted. As Table 4 shows below, all VaR models at either 1% or 5% 
quantile level pass the two-sided Kupiec Test which adds credibility to the 
subsequent        estimation. 
 
 
31 
 
Figure 4 
1% time-varying VaR 
 
Figure 5 
5% time-varying VaR 
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Table 4: 
Two-sided Kupiec Test (1% rejection region) 
  Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo TOPIX BANKS 
1%-Time-varying VaR         
Nr. of violations 38 35 33 35 
  Pass Pass Pass Pass 
          
5%-Time-varying VaR         
Nr. of violations 178 179 181 182 
  Pass Pass Pass Pass 
 
Note: The acceptance region for 1%-VaR is 22 ~52 
 The acceptance region for 5%-VaR is 160 ~ 215 
 
 
Having inspected the credibility of the time-varying VaR models, we can use     
  
together with the selected state variables, namely Nikkei 225, VXJ and Yield 
Spread11 to estimate CoVaRt and △CoVaRt using quantile regression: 
        
    system     system        
    system                
system      
   system                
From this we can then estimate the time-varying        for each institution using 
the following equation: 
         
          
            
  
 
Inspecting the standard deviation and Adjusted   of all three banks at both the 1% 
and 5% quantile levels in Table 5, all banks have an Adjusted    over 60% and 
almost all chosen state variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, in all 
models. This in turn suggests that the state variables have strong explanatory power 
for the time variation in quantiles for CoVaR. Looking at the state variables, we see 
that high VXJ, high yield spread, low market return and low VaR of each institution 
tend to be associated with smaller CoVaRt, i.e. higher systemic risk. 
 
                                                          
11 For a detailed explanation of each state variables refer to Section 4. 
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Table 5: 
CoVaRt Quantile regression results 
Panel A: q=1%             
  α β γ1 γ2 γ3 Adjusted   
Mitsubishi 0,0029 0,4613*** 0,5058*** -0,0005*** -0,0071*** 68,88% 
  (-0,0031) (0,0207) (0,4420) (0,0001) (0,0019) 
 Mizuho -0,001046 0,2708*** 0,6271*** -0,000533** -0,004895 65,97% 
  (0,0071) (0,0147) (0,0628) (0,0002) (0,0031) 
 Sumitomo -0,001906 0,3933*** 0,5685*** -0,00047*** -0,002767 69,67% 
  (0,0031) (0,0137) (0,0258) (0,0001) (0,0018) 
   
      Panel B: q=5%             
  α β γ1 γ2 γ3 Adjusted   
Mitsubishi 0,0043*** 0,5165*** 0,4329*** -0,0003*** -0,0055*** 67,02% 
  (0,0016) (0,0150) (0,0222) (0,0001) (0,0007) 
 Mizuho -0,0006 0,3596*** 0,5249*** -0,0003*** -0,0025*** 62,21% 
  (0,0016) (0,0086) (0,0228) (0,0001) (0,0009) 
 Sumitomo 0,00111 0,4482*** 0,4704*** -0,0003*** -0,0041*** 66,18% 
  (0,0012) (0,0147) (0,0337) (0,000048) (0,0007) 
               
Note : *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** statistical significance at the 0.05 level and 
* statistical significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 6: 
Average Time-varying estimation 
 
  Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo 
 
 Rank   
1%       1 2 3 
VaR -0,0392 -0,0575 -0,0542 Mizuho Sumitomo Mitsubishi 
CoVaR -0,0349 -0,0359 -0,0384 Sumitomo Mizuho Mitsubishi 
△CoVaR -0,0180 -0,0155 -0,0213 Sumitomo Mitsubishi Mizuho 
  
      
5% 
   
1 2 3 
VaR -0,0252 -0,0326 -0,0299 Mizuho Sumitomo Mitsubishi 
CoVaR -0,0230 -0,0235 -0,0239 Sumitomo Mizuho Mitsubishi 
△CoVaR -0,0129 -0,0116 -0,0134 Sumitomo Mitsubishi Mizuho 
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The average of the time-varying CoVaR and △CoVaR results for the three banks are 
exhibited in Table 6 above (the corresponding time-invariant estimates can be seen 
in Table 9). We rank each banks according to their VaR, CoVaR and △CoVaR 
estimates. The 1% and 5% quantile rankings give identical ranking. From Table 6 
we can thus conclude that Mizuho is the riskiest and Mitsubishi is the least risky 
bank in isolation, whereas Sumitomo is observed to have the largest marginal 
systemic risk effect measured by △CoVaR on TOPIX BANKS, i.e. on the whole 
banking system. However Mizuho which has the highest VaR unexpectedly has the 
lowest △CoVaR measured in absolute value. 
In order to better understand how each bank systemically impacts the Japanese 
banking sector over time, we plot the average conditional        
  at both the 1% 
and 5% quantile level for Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo on a quarterly basis 
from 2001-04-02 to 2015-01-31. Studying Figure 6 and Figure 7, a significant drop 
can again clearly be observed in 2008Q4 when the Japanese banks also were 
seriously affected by the global financial meltdown. In addition to this, just like in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 all three banks follow a very similar pattern over time, 
suggesting that they affect the Japanese banking system in the same fashion during a 
crisis. Aside from the above observations, we found two other interesting facts by 
comparing Figure 6 and Figure 7. We start by looking at the 5% quantile case, where 
all three banks follow each other closely. The line of Mizuho is slightly higher than 
that of the others, meaning that its systemic importance is somewhat lower, and the 
other two lines almost entirely coincide. During the financial crisis the △CoVaR of all 
three banks increase substantially in magnitude, with near-identical increase. In the 
1% case we again see that all three banks follow a common trend, but this time with 
a larger gap. Mizuho is again above the others, and more consistently so, whereas 
Sumitomo now clearly is below the other two, especially during the most critical 
time of the financial crisis in 2008Q4. Clearly the gap between the banks is much 
greater than during calmer time periods. Thus it seems like the volatility in systemic 
risk as measured by △CoVaR greatly increases during times of extreme financial 
distress. From this we conclude that even though the probability of an event such as 
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the 2008 financial crisis may be very small the effects should it still happen are 
particularly dire. This further highlights the importance of a deeper understanding 
of systemic risk and the need for further study thereof. 
Figure 6: 
Quarterly average time-varying 1%-△      
 
Figure 7: 
Quarterly average time-varying 5%-△CoVaR 
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5.4 Linkage 
In the previous section we studied the effect an individual bank had on the financial 
system, and in this section we study the effect a bank has on other banks, in a 
pair-wise comparison. 
We can obtain a measure for the impact one bank being in distress has on the risk of 
another bank by specifying the VaR in the definition of CoVaR given by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) to be the VaR of another bank, rather than the VaR of the 
system as we have previously assumed. Similar to Roengpitya and 
Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) we use the time-varying measure of △CoVaRt to calculate 
the linkage between banks. Finally, we present time average results of all measures. 
We used essentially the same procedure as for estimating the time varying 
      
s ste   
 measure, replacing system with k to obtain       
   
, where k refers to 
the bank affected instead of the system, and i refers to the bank whose distress 
affects k, i.e. i is the bank that is conditioned upon. 
Thus the second regression for estimating CoVaR becomes: 
  
             
           
    
Consequently (see previous section and section 3.2.3) we estimate       
   
 and 
       
    at quantile q using: 
        
   
                  
                     
         
                   
         
   
         
   
           
   
 
          allows us to compare the effect different banks being in distress has on a 
single bank, i.e. we can compare different values of           by changing  . 
However, we if we change   these values are no longer comparable. 
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In Table 7 the averages of the estimated        
   
 for all banks   and   pairwise 
can be found12. Looking column by column we see that the distress of Sumitomo has 
the largest effect on risk for both Mitsubishi and Mizuho, whereas Sumitomo is most 
affected by the distress of Mizuho, and this holds both at the 1% and 5% level. 
Comparing the result of           to that of          we see that Sumitomo again 
has the largest effect on Mizuho and Mitsubishi, at both the 1% and 5% level; i.e. the 
results are mostly the same. However, looking at how Sumitomo is affected by the 
other banks we see that          is almost identical when any of the two banks is in 
distress.           is however different, and thus comparing with the median state 
seems to provide additional information. 
Table 7: Average of estimated        
   
 for all banks   and   pairwise. 
Linkage 1%           
  
Linkage 5%           
     
Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo 
 
    
Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo 
    
 
    
Mitsubishi N/A -0,0242 -0,0271 
 
Mitsubishi N/A -0,0171 -0,0164 
Mizuho -0,0155 N/A -0,0300 
 
Mizuho -0,0105 N/A -0,0177 
Sumitomo -0,0258 -0,0418 N/A 
 
Sumitomo -0,0143 -0,0222 N/A 
           Linkage 1%           
 
Linkage 5%           
    
Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo 
 
    
Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo 
    
 
    
Mitsubishi N/A -0,0782 -0,0701 
 
Mitsubishi N/A -0,0436 -0,0383 
Mizuho -0,0496 N/A -0,0699 
 
Mizuho -0,0319 N/A -0,0387 
Sumitomo -0,0562 -0,0867 N/A 
 
Sumitomo -0,0334 -0,0462 N/A 
 
In order to make           comparable for different values of  , we scale these 
values by the time average size of the unconditional VaR (of  ), converting them into 
percentages: 
         
   
    
  
where      
  
 
 
       
 
  with   data points. 
                                                          
12 See Figure 10 to Figure 12 in the Appendix for pairwise        
   
 over time. 
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This allows us to compare the impact one bank being in distress has on banks of 
different sizes. 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the average          
   
 scaled by     
  along with the 
rank. We see that the largest effect observed is that of how Sumitomo being in 
distress affects Mizuho, where we see an increase in VaR from the median state to 
the distress state equivalent to 68,23% and 72,69% of the unconditional VaR of 
Mizuho at the 1% and 5% level respectively. Similarly the smallest effect seen is that 
of how Mizuho being in distress affects Mitsubishi, where we see an increase 
equivalent to 41,58% and 39,44% of the unconditional VaR of Mitsubishi and 
Mizuho at the 1% and 5% level respectively. We see that the ranking of largest and 
smallest is the same at both the 1% and 5% level, and overall the ranking is similar 
at both levels, with the only exception being that #2 and #3 are reversed. 
Comparing the 1% and 5% level results, we see that the differences between the 
effects the banks have on each other are more pronounced in the 1% case. We see 
that both Mizuho and Mitsubishi are strongly linked to Sumitomo, but these two 
banks are not as strongly linked to each other: the effects of either Mizuho or 
Mitsubishi being in distress on Sumitomo are larger than the effects the banks have 
on each other, both in the 1% and 5% case. Finally, the effect of Sumitomo being in 
its 1% distress state has the overall largest effects of the studied events. 
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Figure 8: 
Average 5%         
  scaled by      
 . 
 
Figure 9: 
Average 1%         
  scaled by      
 . 
 
  
   0,5536 #3    0,5005 #4 
   0,6572 #2    0,7269 #1 
   0,4213 #5 
   0,3944 #6 
Sumitomo 
Mizuho Mitsubishi 
    0,5932 #2   0,5481 #4 
   0,5671 #3    0,6823 #1 
   0,5241 #5 
 
   0,4158 #6 
Sumitomo 
Mizuho Mitsubishi 
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis we set out to analyze systemic risk in the Japanese banking system. In 
particular we have studied the systemic risk of the three Japanese mega banks 
dominating the Japanese banking system: Mitsubishi, Mizuho and Sumitomo. 
We have studied 
1) how risky the banks are in isolation, by measuring the VaR of the banks, 
2) the contribution of the banks to the systemic risk of the banking sector, by 
measuring the        between each bank and the system (as proxied by 
TOPIX BANKS), 
3) the systemic linkage among the banks, by measuring the        between 
each bank, pair-wise, and 
4) how using a 1% and 5% significance level affects the result. 
We found Mizuho to be the riskiest bank in isolation, followed by Sumitomo and 
then Mitsubishi. In contrast, we see that Sumitomo seems to be the bank that has the 
largest contribution to the systemic risk of the banking system. 
This is also in line with the result we get in the linkage study, where Sumitomo is the 
bank whose distress has the largest effect on other banks. It has both the overall 
strongest linkage and also the strongest effect on each of the other two banks. 
Sumitomo not only is the bank whose distress has the strongest effect on the other 
two banks, it is itself also most affected by the distress of either of the other two 
banks, whereas the linkage between Mitsubishi and Mizuho is the weakest (in both 
directions). 
From this we conclude that Sumitomo seems to be a key player of the Japanese 
banking system, either by having a direct causal effect on the other banks, or as an 
entity whose distress can serve as a warning signal. 
In order to verify the validity of our models we performed the well-known Kupiec 
test on our VaR measures, all of which passed. We note that the adjusted pseudo-R2 
values are all high, suggesting our models have decent explanatory power. 
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Furthermore we found that using 1% quantiles rather than 5% quantiles gave a 
more pronounced difference between the banks for all measured risk measures, 
suggesting that the spillover effect is more pronounced for more extreme events. 
Thus it would seem that if one has enough data available, it is more fruitful to study 
the data using a more extreme quantile. 
Future areas of improvement on the work in this thesis: 
 We could use other types of data, such as financial statement data of banks. 
In this thesis our estimates are all based on high frequency stock market 
prices and their volatility. Financial statements could conceivably 
complement this with low frequency high quality data. 
 We could take mergers and other changes of financial entities into account. 
This is especially important for longer time periods, and could enable us to 
use data that includes the interesting time period leading up to the 1997 Asia 
financial crisis.  
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet it would have been desirable to 
develop a backtesting model to verify the credibility of our CoVaR models 
directly, similar to the Kupiec test we carried out for our time varying VaR 
models in this thesis. This may require using other modelling techniques 
than used in this paper. It would be an interesting extension to the work in 
this thesis to repeat the work with the CoVaR definition given by Girardi and 
Ergün (2013) which does allow for a Kupiec test. This however also requires 
the use of a less straightforward estimation technique compared to the 
intuitive method using Quantile Regression employed in this thesis. 
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Appendix 
Table 8: G-SIBs as of November 2014  
Americas 
  
Asia 
  
Europe 
  
JP Morgan Chase  USA   Groupe BCPE United Kingdom 
Citigroup  USA   HSBC  United Kingdom 
Bank of America  USA 
Agricultural Bank of 
China 
China 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
 United Kingdom 
Goldman Sachs  USA Bank of China China Barclays  United Kingdom 
Morgan Stanley  USA 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China Limited 
China Standard Chartered  United Kingdom 
Bank of New 
York Mellon 
 USA Mizuho FG Japan BNP Paribas  France 
BBVA Compass USA Sumitomo Mitsui FG Japan Société Générale  France 
State Street  USA Mitsubishi UFJ FG Japan 
Group Crédit 
Agricole 
France 
Wells Fargo  USA 
 
  Credit Suisse   Switzerland 
    
 
  UBS   Switzerland 
 Germany     
 
  Deutsche Bank 
    
 
  Unicredit Group  Italy 
    
 
  ING Bank  Netherlands 
    
 
  Santander  Spain 
        Nordea  Sweden 
 
Data Source: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/gsibs_as_of_2014.htm 
 
Table 9: Time-invariant CoVaR results  
  Mitsubishi Mizuho Sumitomo Rank 
1%       1 2 3 
VaR  -0,0598 -0,0819 -0,0731 Mizuho Sumitomo Mitsubishi 
CoVaR -0,0659 -0,0665 -0,0658 Mizuho Mitsubishi Sumitomo 
△CoVaR -0,0420 -0,0401 -0,0438 Sumitomo Mitsubishi Mizuho 
              
5%       1 2 3 
VaR -0,0360 -0,0460 -0,0408 Mizuho Sumitomo Mitsubishi 
CoVaR -0,0377 -0,0392 -0,0384 Mizuho Sumitomo Mitsubishi 
△CoVaR -0,0256 -0,0238 -0,0250 Mitsubishi Sumitomo Mizuho 
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Figure 10: △CoVaR of Mitsubishi when other banks in distress 
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Figure 11: △CoVaR of Mizuho when other banks in distress 
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Figure 12: △CoVaR of Sumitomo when other banks in distress 
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